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AN INVESTIGATION OF DECISION-MAKING AND THE 









Individual decision making in computer security risk plays a critical role in successful information security management. 
This paper describes a study that investigated how individuals make tradeoffs regarding computer security risk. The study 
asked subjects to make decisions on two hypothetical scenarios in which subjects were asked to choose between avoiding 
computer security risk and accepting a reward. We found that individual computer security risk perception, culture and 
security skills have an impact on their decisions regarding trading off computer security with rewards.  
Keywords 
Computer security risk, risk perception, risk attitude, risk tradeoff, time discounting. 
INTRODUCTION 
Security policies and education are often adopted in organizations to manage computer security risk (Stoneburner, Goguen, 
and Feringa, 2002). However, the success of these efforts largely depends on the individuals involved. An individual decision 
might have a big impact on the information security of the entire organization. For example, an employee might write down 
the password of an important account and leave it close to the desk for convenience. Unknown malware downloaded from the 
Internet can also find its way into an organization’s network via employees’ laptops, emails, or portable data drives. 
Individual decision making involving computer security risk thus plays a critical role in successful information security 
management. Understanding how people make security related decisions will enable engineers to build better security 
systems and facilitate managers to design better security policies and educational programs. The paper focuses on studying 
how individuals make tradeoffs involving computer security risk.  
We conducted an empirical study on the tradeoff between computer security risk and monetary reward. Our study was built 
upon theories from individual decision making and empirical evidence from previous e-commerce research.  Although 
researchers have tried to design software with better security usability (Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005), computer security still 
often involves the tradeoff between security risk and convenience, functionality, or monetary reward. Our study presented the 
subjects with two hypothetical scenarios in which they had to choose between a monetary reward and avoiding an implicit 
computer security risk. We investigated the factors that may have an impact on their decision-making, such as individual 
differences, computer security knowledge and computer experience. Our results provide insight and implications for 
managing computer security risk. 
The next section will provide a conceptual framework of computer security risk tradeoffs grounded by theories from 
individual decision making and evidence from other security risk related literature. Section 3 will describe our empirical 
study. Section 4 will analyze the results from the study.  Section 5 discusses the results and their implications followed by 
conclusions. 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF COMPUTER SECURITY RISK TRADEOFFS 
Previous research has provided some empirical evidence on how end users perceive online security risk (Bhatnagar, Misra, 
and Rao,2000; Miyazaki and Fernadez, 2001). However, little research has been done in providing a theoretical foundation or 
empirical evidence in how individuals make decisions involving computer security risk tradeoffs. To bridge this gap, we 
propose a conceptual framework of individual risk tradeoffs between rewards and computer security, as shown in Figure 1. 
The framework is grounded by theories and evidence from individual decision making. Using this framework, we studied 
three research problems in computer security risk tradeoffs. 1) How do individuals make decisions involving monetary 
rewards? 2) Does individual risk perception towards computer security have an impact on their decisions in the tradeoffs? 3) 
What is the impact of individual differences, computer security knowledge and computer experience on the tradeoffs?  This 
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framework hypothesizes the factors that may have an impact on risk perception and attitude towards computer security risks 
(Chen and Farkas, 2009) and the factors that may have an impact on specific computer security risk tradeoffs, such as 
tradeoffs between the risk and monetary rewards. In our study , we empirically examined four sets of hypotheses (H1, H2, 
H3, and H4) that describe the relationships between the dependent variables - individual computer security risk tradeoffs, and 
the independent variables - risk perception and attitude, individual differences, computer security knowledge and computer 
experience.  
 
Figure 1. A conceptual framework of individual risk tradeoffs between rewards and computer security 
Risk Perception, Risk Attitude, and Risk Tradeoffs 
Hypothesis H1: Individuals who have a higher average risk perception of computer security related activities tend to reject 
rewards and avoid computer security risks (H1.a) and individuals who have a higher average risk attitude towards computer 
security related activities tend to accept rewards and therefore take computer security risks (H1.b). 
Risk perception refers to an individual’s judgment of how risky a certain event is. Understanding how humans perceive the 
exposure and the effects of risk is considered an important part of analyzing and managing technology-induced risk (Morgan, 
1981). However, risk perception of computer security has yet to be fully studied although the general perception of risk has 
been found to greatly impact individual computer decisions (Hardee, West, and Mayhorn, 2006). 
Risk attitude refers to an individual’s decisions or preferences of risk-related choices. This topic has drawn abundant research 
in the field of individual decision making. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) has been the most cited theory in 
this field since it can explain the empirical evidence that violates assumptions in the classical expected utility theory 
(Friedman and Savage, 1948; Machina, 1990) in Economics where an individual’s risk attitude is a function of risk 
preference, outcomes, and the probability of occurrence. Prospect theory explains that people tend to overweigh outcomes 
that are considered certain in comparison to outcomes that are merely probable (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Prospect 
theory has been proposed to explain how individuals make decisions when facing security tradeoffs (West, 2008) but no 
empirical studies have been done at this point. It is unclear if people behave the same way in computer security risk tradeoffs 
compared to economic tradeoffs. In the context of computer security, this theory implies that people will prefer smaller 
security gain over a chance of larger reward and will prefer a chance of larger security loss over a small loss. For example, 
users might choose to risk the possibility of virus infection rather than spend $200 on anti-virus software.   
Other psychological heuristics and biases may also have impacted on individual decisions on security related tradeoffs. In 
particular, one of our scenarios investigated tradeoffs involving inter-temporal choices since many computer security 
decisions involving a time factor. For example, when a user downloads free software from the Internet, the tradeoff would be 
enjoying the immediate convenience or facing potential security risk in the future. Time discounting research (Loewenstein, 
1992; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992) has found that when the outcomes of a decision occur at different times, people tend to 
discount future outcomes. In addition, people prefer immediate gain to future gain and prefer future loss to immediate loss. 
Individual computer security risk tradeoffs 
(i.g. monetary reward) 
Risk Perception and Attitude 
• Average risk perception 
on security related 
activities (H1.a) 





• culture (H2.a) 
• gender (H2.b) 
• age (H2.c) 





• secure web 
technology (H3.a) 
• computer security 
courses (H3.b) 
Computer experience 
• computer usage (H4.a) 
• web usage (H4.b) 
• computer access (H4.c) 
• security skill (H4.d) 
• online shopping (H4.e) 
• online finance (H4.f) 
H1 H2 H3 H4 
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Individual Differences, Computer Security Knowledge and Computer Experience 
Hypothesis H2: Both culture (H2.a) and gender (H2.b) have an impact on an individual’s computer security risk decisions. 
Younger students are more likely to tradeoff computer security risk with rewards (H2.c) and so do undergraduate students 
(H2.d).  
Hypothesis H3: Individuals who know more about secure web technology (H3.a) and who are more educated in computer 
security subjects (H3.b) are less likely to tradeoff computer security risk with rewards.  
Hypothesis H4: Individuals who are more computer savvy are less likely to tradeoff computer security risk with reward.  
This includes individuals who use computers more frequently (H4.a), who browse the web more frequently (H4.b), who have 
computer access both at work and at home (H4.c), who have more security skills (H4.d), who have  had online shopping 
experiences (H4.e) and who have conducted online financial transactions (H4.f). 
Research in e-commerce has provided empirical evidence on how end users perceive online security risk. The technological 
risks of using the Internet are considered a factor when consumers make Internet shopping decisions (Bhatnagar, Misra, and 
Rao,2000). Greater Internet experience and the use of other remote purchasing methods have been found to be related to 
lower levels of perceived risk toward online shopping (Miyazaki and Fernadez, 2001). One study found that the lack of 
specific knowledge of web site authentication makes users vulnerable to attacks (Dhamija, Tygar, and Hearst, 2006). The 
mental model approach (Norman, 1983) has been used in risk communication to understand an individual’s reasoning of 
specific risk in areas such as environmental (Morgon, Fischhoff, Bostrom, and Atman, 2001), data privacy (Diesner, 
Kumaraguru, and Carley, 2005) and computer security (Asgharpour, Liu, and Camp, 2007; Liu, Asgharpour, and Camp, 
2007). Using a card sorting game, researchers have found that mental models of computer security risk strongly correlate to 
an individual’s expertise in security (Asgharpour et al., 2007). Research has also shown that risk perception is different in 
different domains (Weber, Blais and Betz, 2002) and in different cultures (Weber and Hsee, 1998).  
Studies have shown that the lack of correct information about privacy technology is one of the reasons people ignore online 
privacy (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005). In addition, various empirical studies (Dhamija et al., 2006; Downs, Holbrook and 
Cranor, 2007) on phishing have shown that users lack the specific knowledge necessary to distinguish genuine web sites from 
fake ones. Incomplete information or lack of specific security knowledge could be the factors hindering judgment when 
making secure decisions. An individual’s experience with technology and computer security may also play a role in 
providing one with the information used in making judgments on decisions regarding computer security risk. 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
We conducted a web-based survey from May to June 2008. In the survey, we asked subjects to rate 7 computer security 
activities, listed in Appendix A, using a five-point Likert scale. For each activity, the subjects were asked to express how 
likely they were to engage in this activity to elicit risk attitude and how risky they perceived this activity to elicit risk 
perception. All 7 activities describe situations when subjects have to take some computer security risk in order to gain a 
certain benefit, such as reading news online, obtaining free software, etc.  
Subjects were asked to make decisions on two hypothetical scenarios, listed in Appendix B. The scenarios were about 
shopping online for a digital camera. In the first scenario, we investigated tradeoffs regarding monetary rewards. The subjects 
were asked to choose between accepting reward and rejecting reward. Accepting a reward refers to paying less for a digital 
camera with some uncertain security risk by accepting an unknown web script.  Rejecting a reward refers to paying more for 
the same digital camera with no security risk. We did not explicitly identify the security risk in the scenario. When the 
subjects decided to accept reward, they were asked to select a level of reward from $10 cheaper to $50 cheaper than the $200 
original price for the camera. In the second scenario, we investigated risk tradeoffs regarding a time delay as reward. The 
subjects were asked to choose between a “delay” reward and an “immediate” reward. Immediate reward refers to paying less 
immediately with some uncertain security risk and delay reward refers to paying the same as the first choice only after 
redeeming a mail-in debate three months later with no security risk. In addition, subjects were asked for demographics, 
computer security knowledge, and computer experience.  
RESULT ANALYSES 
The participants were graduate and undergraduate students attending a university in the Northeast United States.  Some of the 
students were online while others were taking a regular lecture based class. The survey was anonymous and the students did 
not receive any reward or course credit for participation. There were a total of 131 students and 112 of them completed the 
entire survey. We analyzed only the responses from subjects who completed all the survey questions. Among them, 65 (58%) 
are males and 47 (42%) are females. The subjects include four age groups, 31 (27.7%) are between 18 to 20, 59 (52.7%) are 
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between 20 to 29, 13 (11.6%) are between 30 to 39, and 9 (8%) are between 40 to 49. The responses are from 67 (60%) 
undergraduate students and 45 (40%) graduate students. The undergraduates were mostly freshmen, who were taking a 
university level computer introductory course. The graduate students were from three information technology related 
Master’s programs, including Information Systems, Computer Science and Internet Technology. Most of the graduate 
students were working professionals. Among the graduate students, there was a cohort of India nationals, living and working 
in Bangalore, India taking the courses online. 
Risk Tradeoffs  
In the first scenario, 46 (41%) subjects chose to buy the digital camera from the online store with security risk and 59 (59%) 
chose not to buy it from the online store with security risk no matter how much cheaper the camera is. Table 1 shows the 
results in detail. Our subjects tended to accept the reward at two extremes: they would either accept it as long as there was a 
reward or they would only accept it at the highest price that they could get. This result implies that our subjects varied a lot in 
terms of their assessment of value for security risk. Research (Grossklags and Acquisti, 2007) has shown that subjects prefer 
to accept monetary reward over protecting data in two personal information protection scenarios. Further research is needed 
to investigate subjects’ willingness to accept a reward for taking computer security risks. 
 Choices Frequency Percent 
Will accept unknown web script for $10 cheaper 16 14% 
Will accept unknown web script for $20 cheaper 4 3.6% 
Will accept unknown web script for $30 cheaper 4 3.6% 
Will accept unknown web script for $40 cheaper 4 3.6% 
Will accept unknown web script for $50 cheaper 18 16% 
Do not tradeoff security with a cheaper price 66 58% 
Total 112 100% 
Table 1. Results from the first scenario 
In the second scenario, 78 (70%) subjects chose the delay reward and 34 (30%) chose the immediate reward. The percentage 
of subjects (30%) who decided to take the security risk is less than the percentage (41%) in the first scenario. Table 2 is a 
cross table of the two decisions. We observed three types of risk tradeoffs. The first group of subjects (77%) was consistent 
in both scenarios regarding their risk tradeoffs. Among them, 59 (53%) try to avoid the security risk in both scenarios by 
rejecting the monetary and immediate rewards. 27 (24%) accepted the security risk in both scenarios by accepting the 
monetary and immediate rewards. The second group of subjects (17%) chose to avoid the security risk as long as they 
obtained a reward. These subjects decided to take the security risk by accepting the monetary reward but avoided the security 
risk with the delay reward. The third group of subjects was inconsistent in their risk tradeoffs. 7 (6%) subjects decided to 
avoid the security risk by rejecting the monetary reward but they chose the immediate reward to accept the security risk. It is 
not clear what rationale was behind their choices. It is possible that the subjects made the choices randomly without 
understanding the scenarios. 
  Scenario two (time delay reward) 





Rejecting reward 59 (53%) 7 (6%) 66 (59%) 
Accepting reward 19 (17%) 27 (24%) 46 (41%) 
 Total 78 (70%) 34 (30%) 112 
Table 2. Cross table of the responses from both scenarios  
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Individual Difference, Computer Security Knowledge and Computer Experience 
We conducted a regression analysis to investigate hypotheses H1-H4 proposed in our conceptual framework. We analyzed 
the impact of independent variables on the choices in the two scenarios: the choice between accepting and rejecting a 
monetary reward and the choice between delay reward and immediate reward. Binary logistic regression was used since the 
dependent variables are binary. 
Table 3 shows the independent variables that have significant impact at p<0.05. To study the impact of computer security risk 
perception on subjects’ choices on the two scenarios, we calculated the average ratings of risk perception, denoted as average 
risk perception, and the average ratings of risk attitude, denoted as average risk attitude, towards the 7 computer security risk 
activities in Appendix A. We have five observations here.  
1) Culture was a significant factor in the reward choice (supports hypothesis H2.a). The Indian students were more 
likely to accept a reward than non-Indian students (mostly US students) at p=0.02. We suspect that less Internet 
shopping experience might have an impact on the Indian students’ decisions, but further study with a larger sample 
size is needed to verify this hypothesis.  
2) Average risk perception was negatively correlated to both choices (supports hypothesis H1.a). This result implies 
that subjects who rejected the reward or chose the delay reward were more likely to be aware of the security risk 
than the subjects who accepted the monetary or immediate rewards.  
3) Average risk attitude was positively correlated to both choices (supports hypothesis H1.b). This result implies that 
subjects who were more likely to engage in other types of computer security risk were also more likely to accept the 
monetary or immediate reward.  
4) Security skill was negatively correlated to both choices (supports hypothesis H4.d). Subjects who had practiced 
more security skills, such as encrypting their emails or using software to detect spyware, were more likely to reject 
the monetary reward or to accept the delay reward. This result confirmed findings in (Asgharpour et al., 2007) in 
which computer security risk taking strongly correlated to an individual’s level of expertise in security.  
5) We did not find significant correlation to support other hypotheses (rejects H2.b, c, d; H3; and H4a, b, c, e, f at 
p=0.05) in the conceptual model. We did not find any significant correlation between the two choices and other 
computer experience, such as computer usage or online shopping experience, subjects’ knowledge on web security 
technology and subjects’ previous education in security courses.  
 
Dependent variables independent 
variables 
Chi-
square  B S.E. Wald p Exp(B) 
Monetary reward 
(1: accepting 
reward/ 0: rejecting 
reward) 
culture 6.70 -1.52 0.66 5.28 0.02 0.22 
average risk 
perception* 16.80 -1.21 0.33 13.58 <0.01 0.30 
average risk 
attitude* 
2.44 0.49 24.76 1.00 <0.01 11.46 
security skill 8.28 -0.24 0.09 7.48 0.01 0.79 
Time delay reward 
(1: immediate 
reward/ 0: delay 
reward) 
average risk 
perception * 14.51 -1.22 0.36 11.67 <0.01 0.30 
average risk 
attitude* 
0.92 0.32 8.01 1.00 <0.01 2.50 
security skill 6.51 -0.22 0.09 6.17 0.01 0.80 
Table 3. Regression results for both monetary and time delay reward tradeoffs (* denotes p<0.01.) 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Prospect theory predicts that people tend to have inconsistent preferences when the same choice is framed differently 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Risk attitudes are different depending if the outcome is framed as a gain or a loss. People 
tend to be risk averse when the choice is framed as a gain but people tend to be risk seeking when the choice is framed as a 
loss. In the first scenario, we did not specifically frame our choices as gains or losses but different subjects might interpret the 
choices differently. Table 4 shows the possible interpretations of the choices in our scenarios. When the choices were 
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interpreted as gains, based on Prospect theory, our subjects should accept the reward. When the choices were interpreted as 
losses, our subjects should also accept the reward.  
 Accepting reward Rejecting reward 
Choices framed as gains Certain monetary 
reward 
Uncertain computer security 
benefit 
Choices framed as losses Uncertain computer 
security loss 
Certain monetary reward 
loss 
Table 4. Framing the choices in the first scenario  
However, the assumption behind the prediction is that the expected values of the two choices are equal. The expected value 
of computer security risk is hard to estimate since the probability of occurrence is hard to obtain. Individuals might have 
different perceived risk and have different valuation of computer security benefit as well. As we found in the previous 
section, subjects who perceived higher risk were more likely to reject the monetary reward. Their expected value of avoiding 
security risk was thus higher than the monetary reward presented in the choice. That is, their expected value of avoiding 
downloading the web script was more than $50 in the first scenario. For example, a technical savvy user might perceive a 
higher risk from the first scenario and therefore is less likely to accept the $50 reward but might accept a higher reward if it is 
expressed explicitly. We also observed similar results in the second scenario. If the subjects discounted a future reward, they 
should choose to take the immediate reward unless the expected value of the security benefit compensated the reward 
discounted by time.  
Our results provide some insights into computer security risk management. First, the users have shown to be the weakest link 
in security from our observations. Although about 53% of our subjects chose to avoid security risk in both scenarios, 47% of 
subjects accepted the security risk in either one or both scenarios, which is a large percentage for computer security 
protection strategies to be effective. For example, an Internet worm could exploit the computers of these subjects and execute 
a denial of service attack to the servers managed by individuals who would choose to avoid the risk in the first place. 
Phishing attacks could be profitable even if they can only allure 47% of the users who have received phishing emails. 
Second, since average risk perception in security is a significant factor in computer security risk tradeoff, communicating 
computer security risk to the users might hold the key to reducing the risk, such as educating users about the likelihood of 
certain computer security incidents. Last but not least, educators can introduce users to more hands-on skills in computer 
security since our study found that individuals who have more security skills are less likely to tradeoff computer security risk 
with rewards.  
CONCLUSIONS  
We conducted an empirical study comparing tradeoffs on computer security risk and analyzed the variables that might have 
an impact on them. Our analyses showed that individuals who perceived higher computer security risk tend to reject 
monetary reward and avoid risk than individuals who had a lower risk perception. In addition, both culture and security skill 
have an impact on decision-making when avoiding computer security risk. Further research can be conducted to investigate 
the willingness to accept a reward for taking computer security risk and associated expected value on different types of 
computer security risk. 
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APPENDIX A: RISK QUESTIONS IN COMPUTER SECURITY 
1. Clicking on a unknown web link sent by a friend through emails  
2. Accepting unknown web scripts in order to watch your favorite show online  
3. Downloading free software from unknown sources on the Internet 
4. Accepting web cookies to read online newspaper  
5. Saving user names and passwords of web sites on your computer for future access 
6. Purchasing a product from an online merchant that you have not heard of before 
7. Accepting unknown web scripts in order to pay your bill online 
 
APPENDIX B: RISK TRADEOFF SCENARIOS 
Scenario 1: Assume that you decide to purchase a digital camera from an online store that offers the best price. The camera is 
$200 (USD). When making an order on this online store, the browser asks you if you would like to accept unknown web 
scripts from the store's web site. Which of the options would you choose? 
A. Will accept unknown web scripts from the store if the camera is $10 (USD) cheaper than other stores. 
B. Will accept unknown web scripts from the store if the camera is $20 (USD) cheaper than other stores. 
C. Will accept unknown web scripts from the store if the camera is $30 (USD) cheaper than other stores. 
D. Will accept unknown web scripts from the store if the camera is $40 (USD) cheaper than other stores. 
E. Will accept unknown web scripts from the store if the camera is $50 (USD) cheaper than other stores. 
F. Will not accept unknown web scripts no matter how much cheaper this store sells the camera compared to other stores. 
You will buy the camera from another store. 
 
Scenario 2: Assume that you decide to choose from two online stores that both sell the same digital camera. Which of the 
following options would you choose? 
Store A charges $200 (USD) for the camera but asks you to accept unknown web scripts while making the order. 
Store B charges $250 (USD) for the same camera but offers a mail-in rebate through which you can reclaim $50 (USD) three 
months later. 
